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The Heterogeneous Effects of Trade on Asymmetric
Countries
Badis Tabarki∗
June 4, 2015
Abstract
In order to investigate the effects of trade on asymmetric countries, we build a simple two-
country Melitz Model with cross-country efficiency differences and market size variations. We
also introduce a public good financed by Tax revenues. We find that Free Trade makes the
more efficient country produce more and alleviate the fiscal burden on its economy,the effects
are completely opposite for the other country. Furthermore, we show that when the relative
size of the technologically advanced country is large enough, we assist to an agglomeration
of resources in this country. The main contribution of this paper is to prove that the more
asymmetric the countries are, the more heterogeneous is the impact of Trade on their respective
GDP, Aggregate Profits and Tax rate.
1 Introduction
The 20th century ended by putting an end to the era of the standard representative firm assumption
in Trade models. The recent emergence of firm level data has paved the way to substantial empirical
work which revealed that firms exhibit different levels of productivity even within a narrowly-defined
industry and that this tremendous productivity heterogeneity implies selection into exporting. In
their seminal papers, Bernard and Jensen (1995,1999) shed light on the fact that within an industry,
only a small subset of very efficient firms export.
Moreover, influential empirical findings by Pavcnik(2002) and Tybout(2003) has identified efficiency
∗I am grateful to my advisor Professor. Lionel Fontagne´ for invaluable guidance and constant encouragement. I
also would like to thank Antoine Vatan for helpful comments.
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gains from Trade at the industry level. Trade liberalization reallocates market shares from less effi-
cient domestic firms to very efficient foreign exporters. This inter-firm reallocation forces the least
productive firms to exit the market, thus increases average productivity at the industry level.
These stylized facts announced the birth of the New New Trade Theory since they could never be
explained by previous international trade theories. Classical Trade theories were successful only
in explaining inter-industry trade by differences in technology (Ricardian Comparative Advantage)
and in relative endowments as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
In Krugman(1980), even though the emphasis is on intra-industry trade, firms are identical within
an industry and there is no selection into exporting. In response to these empirical challenges,
Melitz(2003) provided an extension to the New Trade Theory which features firm heterogeneity
and self-selection into producing domestically and exporting due to the presence of sunk fixed costs
of entry, production and export.
This New New Trade Theory highlighted three gains from Trade. Trade liberalization reallocates
market shares from low productivity domestic suppliers to very productive foreign exporters. This
forces the least efficient firms to exit the market and makes high productivity suppliers expand
to enter international markets. Thus, average productivity increases at the industry level and the
labor force that used to be employed by the least productive firms is henceforth reallocated to the
most efficient ones. This efficiency gain implies a variety gain. In fact, market shares reallocation
generates a simultaneous increase of the domestic cutoff and decrease of the export cutoff, which
raises the probability of export in all countries, thus the Mass of exported varieties. As a result,
each country enjoys a variety gain since the loss of domestic varieties is overcompensated by the
arrival of much more imported varieties from each one of its trading partners.
Finally, the Welfare gain actually stems from these two gains discussed above. While the increase
in average productivity induces a decrease in average price, a larger Mass of available varieties is
synonym to a larger Mass of competing firms at the industry level. This clearly leads to a decrease
in the Aggregate Price level. As a result, the purchasing power increases since the nominal wage is
normalized to 1.
Melitz(2003) describes a perfect world where, not only, all countries gain from trade in terms of effi-
ciency, variety and Welfare, but also, these gains are identical across trading partners. Even though
this result mainly stems from the symmetry assumption stating that countries have the same size
and identical productivity distribution, trade literature exhibits few trials to investigate the nature
of the impact of Trade on asymmetric countries. In fact, far from addressing the asymmetric case,
the new wave of heterogeneous firms models, which emerged after the birth of the New New Trade
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theory, has only focused on altering some technical assumptions and extending the baseline model
in an attempt to reconcile it with new empirical features of firm level data.
In Melitz (2003), each firm produces only a variety of the differentiated good and draws a pro-
ductivity level that remains unchanged overtime. Moreover, gains from trade arise only at the
industry level through inter-firm reallocation. These results are at odds with recent empirical find-
ings showing that trade may lead to substantial firm productivity improvement through intra-firm
reallocation of resources. In order to make the benchmark model capture these new features of the
data, Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2014) built a heterogeneous firms model with multi-product
firms. They find that Trade liberalization improves within-firm productivity and reallocates within-
firm factors to the best products since it increases the productivity cutoff to produce a given number
of products and makes firm focus on their core competence.
One of the limits of the Melitz model is that Trade liberalization has only a quantity effect re-
allocating the volume of sales across firms while it has no impact on the prices they set. This
rigidity of the pricing rule is explained, not only, by the fact that the productivity level of a firm
remains unchanged, but also, by its constant markup implied by CES preferences. To allow markup
flexibility, Melitz and Ottaviano(2008) substituted CES by quasi-linear preferences. They find that
Trade liberalization is welfare improving since it simultaneously increases average productivity and
decreases average markup. Their result illustrates price reactivity to fiercer competition imposed
by trade.
Even though this very tractable model has been widely extended, Trade literature remains silent on
the nature of the impact of trade on asymmetric countries. The first extension of the Melitz model
to the asymmetric countries case was provided by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2003). They assume
that countries have an identical productivity distribution and only differ in market size. Using the
Home market effect, they show that larger countries enjoy larger mass of available varieties and
higher welfare. Their results suggest that bigger countries enjoy higher gains from trade. Building
on the work of HMY (2003), Falvey et al. (2004) add an additional feature of country-level asymme-
try in terms of productivity distribution. They find that trade liberalization between two countries
displaying differences in market size and average productivity improves industry efficiency and wel-
fare in both countries, but this positive impact of trade is more magnified for the more efficient
country. These two papers provide two distinct responses to the following question: which country
reaps greater gains from trade? The larger, as implicitly suggested by HMY (2003) and the more
efficient according to Falvey et al. (2004). Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) provide a unique response
which is a combination of both. In their setting characterized by quasi-linear preferences, the larger
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country is by construction the more efficient. While all these extensions ensure that all countries
gain from trade and emphasize that market size differences or cross-country efficiency gaps only
make the gains from exposure to trade accrue disproportionately to the larger and/or more efficient
country, a key contribution by Demidova (2008) revealed that trade liberalization generates welfare
gains for the technologically advanced country and welfare losses for its trading partner when the
technological gap between the two countries is deep enough. Moreover, she highlighted that the
impact of trade on welfare in both countries is identical to that of a technological improvement in
the more advanced country. More importantly, Demidova (2008) showed that trade deepens the
welfare gap between two countries which are already displaying large technological asymmetry.
While the works of Falvey et al.(2004) and Devidova(2008) focused on the heterogeneity of the effect
of trade on welfare of asymmetric countries, this paper investigates the nature of the impact of full
trade liberalization on GDP, Aggregate Profits and tax rates in countries with different productivity
distributions and market sizes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. The closed economy equilibrium
is derived in Section 3. Section 4 lays out the properties of the equilibrium in open economy and
highlights the impact of free trade. Section 5 studies the determinants of FDI and its effects on the
GDP of both countries and section 6 concludes.
2 Set up of the Model
2.1 Public Intervention
We assume that Public Intervention is identical in both countries ”A” and ”B”.In fact, each Gov-
ernment produces L units of the public good and equally distributes it on its population for free.
Hence, individual consumption of the public good is rationed to 1.
Both Governments share the same technology, their ”unit labor need” is equal to 1
L
.
The Government’s ”Cost Function” is then written as follow: C(L)= 1
L
L=1
Given that the Nominal wage ”w” is equalized across these 2 countries and normalized to 1 (w=1),
Public Expenditures are thus equal to 1 for both countries: GA = GB = 1
Each Government taxes Aggregate Profits made by the private sector to finance its expenditures,its
”Budget Constraint” is given by:
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-Country A: TA=tA ΠA=GA=1
-Country B: TB=tB ΠB=GB=1
2.2 Demand
A representative consumer consumes Ω varieties of the differentiated good and 1 unit of the Public
good. His preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas Utility function:
U = [(
∫
ω
q(ω)ρdω)1/ρ)]αq(g)1−α where ρ = σ−1
σ
and σ=CES between Ω varieties of the differentiated
good. Since q(g) is rationed to 1,Utility can then be similar to this of the Baseline Model:
U = [
∫
ω
q(ω)ρdω]1/ρ and The optimal consumption of a variety ω is: q(ω) = Q[p(ω)
P
]−σ
2.3 Supply
2.3.1 Asymmetry
The main feature of Asymmetry between these 2 countries consists in the fact that the initial
productivity draw is more favorable for Country A.In other words,the probability to get a a given
level of productivity ϕ is higher for a firm located in Country”A” as compared with another firm
established in Country”B”.
To illustrate this, we parameterize the ”Pareto Distribution” as follow:
Take ϕmax, g(ϕ) = (
ϕ
ϕmax
)k such that gA(ϕ) = (
ϕ
ϕmax
)kA > gB(ϕ) = (
ϕ
ϕmax
)kB with kA < kB
This implies that ∀ϕ,GA(ϕ) < GB(ϕ) where G(ϕ) is the Distribution function.
As result, for the same productivity cutoff ϕ∗,the probability of a successful entry is higher for firms
located in Country”A”: ∀ϕ∗, [1−GA(ϕ
∗)] > [1−GB(ϕ
∗)]
2.3.2 Pricing Rule,Revenues and Profits
Optimal price: ∀ the country, p(ϕ) = 1
ρϕ
= ρ−1ϕ−1
Firm Revenues: rA(ϕ) = RA[
p(ϕ)
PA
]1−σ ; rB(ϕ) = RB[
p(ϕ)
PB
]1−σ
Firm Profit: piA(ϕ) =
rA(ϕ)
σ
− f ; piB(ϕ) =
rB(ϕ)
σ
− f
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3 Closed Economy Equilibrium
3.1 Conditions of the Equilibrium
1-the Zero Cutoff Profit Condition:
As in Melitz(2003),the Zero Cutoff Profit (ZCP) condition is given by the following equation ex-
pressing the average profit p¯i as a function of the productivity cutoff ϕ∗:
(ZCP ) : p¯i = pi(ϕ˜) = fk(ϕ∗) (1)
The principle of this condition is available for both countries, thus the (ZCP) condition is identical
for these two countries.
2- The Free Entry Condition:
(FE) : p¯i =
δfe
[1−G(ϕ∗)]
(2)
Knowing that for a given cutoff level ϕ∗,the probability of success is higher for plants established in
Country”A”,the equation above (FE) implies that the average profit p¯i is lower in this country,which
is quite intuitive because competition is fiercer between relatively more efficient firms as compared
with Coutry”B”.This can be expressed as follow: Since ∀ϕ∗, [1−GA(ϕ
∗)] > [1−GB(ϕ
∗)], piA < piB
Graphically,this means the (FE) curve of Country”A” is below this of Country”B”, yielding a higher
productivity cutoff in Country”A”: ϕ∗A > ϕ
∗
B as illustrated in the figure below:
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3.2 Equilibrium Mass of firms,GDP and Aggregate Profits
We assume that both countries have the same size: λ = LA
LB
= RA
RB
= 1.
The Mass of firms in each country are given by: MA =
RA
r¯A
= LA
σ(piA+f)
and MB =
RB
r¯B
= LB
σ(piB+f)
We have to note that even if the market size is identical for both countries,the Mass of firms is higher
in Country”A” since the average profit is lower in this more competitive country: for LA = LB,
MA > MB since p¯iA < p¯iB.
Countries’Outputs can be computed as follow:
GDPA = MAq˜A where q˜A = RA(
p(ϕ˜A)
PA
)−σ is the average output per firm in Country”A”
GDPB = MB q˜B where q˜B = RB(
p(ϕ˜B)
PB
)−σ is, similarly, the output of an average productivity firm
in Country”B”.
Aggregate Profits are written as follow:ΠA = MApiA and ΠB = MBpiB
For more simplicity,we equalize GDP and Aggregate Profits using a condition stating that if the
Mass of firms is x percent higher is Country”A”, average profit and average output are then x
percent higher in Country”B”: GDPA=GDPB and ΠA = ΠB iff
MA
MB
=piB
piA
= q˜B
q˜A
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3.3 Equilibrium Tax rates
Each Government chooses a tax rate ”t” that balances its budget:
Gov′As budget constraint : tAΠA = 1 ⇒ t
∗
A =
1
ΠA
Gov′Bs budget constraint : tBΠB = 1 ⇒ t
∗
B =
1
ΠB
Aggregate Profits are equalized across these 2 countries, thus the equilibrium tax rate is identical
for both countries: t∗A=t
∗
B
3.4 Analysis of the Equilibrium
Average productivity in each country is written as follow:
ϕ˜A = [
ϕmax∫
ϕ∗
A
ϕσ−1µA(ϕ)dϕ]
1
σ−1 and ϕ˜B = [
ϕmax∫
ϕ∗
B
ϕσ−1µB(ϕ)dϕ]
1
σ−1
Since the productivity cutoff is higher in Country”A”, average productivity is higher in this country:
ϕ∗A > ϕ
∗
B ⇒ ϕ˜A > ϕ˜B. Moreover, given that Country”A” hosts a lager Mass of firms, the Aggregate
productivity is then higher in this country: ϕ˜A > ϕ˜B andMA > MB ⇒ φA = MAϕ˜A > φB = MBϕ˜B.
The Aggregate Price level P = M
1
(1−σ)p(ϕ˜) where p(ϕ˜) = ρ−1ϕ˜−1 is a decreasing function of the
Mass of firms ”M” and an increasing function of the average price”p(ϕ˜). Not only, the Mass of
firms, but also, the average productivity is higher in Country”A”, thus The Aggregate Price level
is lower in this Country: PA < PB.
Recall that the Nominal Wage ”w” is equalized across countries and normalized to 1. This implies
that consumers in Country”A” enjoy a higher purchasing power and a larger set of available varieties,
which is synonym of higher Welfare.
This result mirrors the ”Home efficiency effect” reported in Falvey et al(2004) and Demidova(2008).
Even if these two countries have the same size, average productivity is higher in the more efficient
country. This implies, not only, a larger Mass of firms, but also, a lower average price. As a
result, consumers in this country enjoy higher welfare. This is also in line with the findings of
Helpman,Melitz and Yeaple(2003) who showed that larger countries enjoy higher Welfare. However,
we have to note that their results are solely driven by the ”Home market effect”. In Melitz and
Ottaviano(2008), a larger country is more efficient by construction. Thus, its higher welfare is
explained by its larger variety range, higher average productivity and lower average markup.
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4 Open Economy Equilibrium
In open economy, the two countries create a Currency Union. As a result, they freely trade and the
Nominal wage remain equalized across these two members due to free labor mobility.
4.1 Export Revenues versus Domestic Revenues
In Melitz(2003): rd(ϕ) = R(
p(ϕ
P
)1−σ and rx(ϕ) = τ
1−σrd(ϕ). The export revenues are function of
the domestic revenues simply because by symmetry, the Aggregate Revenues”R” and the Aggre-
gate Price”P” are identical across countries. However, in this extension of the baseline model, even
if we have assumed that both countries have the same size(LA=LB), thus the same level of Ag-
gregate expenditure(RA=RB=R), the Aggregate Price level remains lower in Country”A”:PA < PB.
It is then intuitive to express the domestic revenues as a function of the Demand characteristics
of the domestic country and the export revenues as a function of the Demand determinants of the
Destination country, as follow:
rAd (ϕ) = R(
p(ϕ)
PA
)1−σ and rAx (ϕ) = Rτ
1−σ(p(ϕ)
PB
)1−σ
rBd (ϕ) = R(
p(ϕ)
PB
)1−σ and rBx (ϕ) = Rτ
1−σ(p(ϕ)
PA
)1−σ
Using the export revenues equations above, we can easily notice that for the same level of produc-
tivity and the same export price, exporters from Country”A” have a lower relative export price on
their destination market(Country”B”) which is characterized by a higher Aggregate Price level. In
other words, Country A’s exporters enjoy a higher international price competitiveness as compared
to those of Country B, thus they generate higher export revenues and profits as shown below:
rAx (ϕ)
rBx (ϕ)
= pi
A
x (ϕ)
piBx (ϕ)
= (PB
PA
)σ−1 > 1
4.2 Equilibrium Export Cutoffs
Assuming that the export cutoff is identical in both countries, we can intuitively infer,as proved
above, that the export cutoff revenues are higher for exporters from Country”A”. This means that
while the export cutoff profit is equal to zero(as the definition suggests) for country B’s exporters,
it is strictly positive for Country A’s exporters. As a result the export cutoff has to be lower in
Country A such that it equalizes the relative cutoff export price across countries, which ensures
that the export cutoff profit is identical for exporters from both countries and equal to zero:
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ϕ∗Ax < ϕ
∗B
x such that (
p(ϕ∗Ax )
PB
)=(p(ϕ
∗B
x )
PA
) ⇒ rAx (ϕ
∗A
x )=r
B
x (ϕ
∗B
x ) = σfx ⇒ pi
A
x (ϕ
∗
x) = pi
B
x (ϕ
∗
x) = 0
For proof by contradiction, see Appendix 1.1
4.3 Average Export Revenues and Profits
The fact that export cut off is lower in Country A means that average export productivity is lower in
this country. This implies that the average export price is higher in this country, but once deflated
by a higher Aggregate Price level in the destination country(B), relative average export prices are
equalized across these two countries. Hence, average export revenues and profits are identical for
exporters from both countries:
ϕ∗Ax < ϕ
∗B
x ⇒ ϕ˜
A
x < ϕ˜
B
x ⇒ p(ϕ˜
A
x ) > p(ϕ˜
B
x ) ⇒ (
p(ϕ˜Ax )
PB
) = (p(ϕ˜
B
x )
PA
)
⇒ rAx (ϕ˜
A
x ) = r
B
x (ϕ˜
B
x ) = r¯x ⇒ pi
A
x (ϕ˜
A
x ) = pi
B
x (ϕ˜
B
x ) = p¯ix
4.4 Probability of Export and Mass of Exporters
As in Melitz(2003), we define the probability of export in each country as follow:
PAx = [1−GA(ϕ
∗A
x )]/[1−GA(ϕ
∗
A)]
PBx = [1−GB(ϕ
∗B
x )]/[1−GB(ϕ
∗
B)]
As compared with country B, Country A has, not only, a higher domestic cutoff, but also, a lower
export cutoff. Hence, the probability of export is higher in this country, which hosts also a larger
Mass of firms. Thus, Country A has a higher Mass of exporters:
PAx > P
B
x and MA > MB ⇒ M
A
x = P
A
x MA > M
B
x = P
B
x MB
4.5 Mass of Exiting Firms
In the baseline model, Marc Melitz, using simple static comparatives, shows that a firm with a
higher productivity level generates higher revenues as compared with a less efficient firm. This
implies that 2 firms have the same level of revenues only and only if their initial productivity level
is identical:
r(ϕ′)
r(ϕ)
= (ϕ
′
ϕ
)σ−1 ⇒ r(ϕ′) = r(ϕ) iff ϕ′=ϕ
In subsection(4.3), we equalized average export revenues across countries, which implicitly induces
that average export productivity could be identical for both countries:
rAx (ϕ˜
A
x ) = r
B
x (ϕ˜
B
x ) = r¯x ⇒ ϕ˜
A
x = ϕ˜
B
x = ϕ˜x
In order to quantify the pro-competitive effect of Trade,we use the same static comparatives tech-
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nique as in Melitz(2003). In fact, we compare the revenues of an average productivity exporter
to those of an average productivity domestic firm on the destination market. Hence, we easily
determine, for each country, the number of domestic plants that are forced to exit the market due
to the entry of 1 exporter as follow:
rAx (ϕ˜
A
x )
rB
d
(ϕ˜B)
= ( ϕ˜x
τϕ˜B
)σ−1 = θA ;
rBx (ϕ˜
B
x )
rA
d
(ϕ˜A)
= ( ϕ˜x
τϕ˜A
)σ−1 = θB
These static comparatives reveal that the pro-competitive effect of Trade is more magnified for
Country”B”. In fact, the number of exiting domestic firms per average exporter(θ) is higher in this
country: ϕ˜B < ϕ˜A ⇒ θA > θB. Multiplying this number by the Mass of exporters, we get the Mass
of Exiting firms in each country: MBEX = θAM
A
x > M
A
EX = θBM
B
x .
4.6 Equilibrium Mass of Firms and Average Profit in Open Economy
In each country, the Mass of firms in open economy is actually the Mass of firms that survive after
full liberalization of Trade. In other words,it is equal to the equilibrium Mass of firms in closed
economy net of the Mass of exiting firms.
In open economy,the Mass of firms remains larger in Country”A”, not only, because it was already
larger in closed economy,but also,due to the fact that the pro-competitive of Trade is less magnified
for this country, implying a smaller Mass of exiting firms:
MOA = MA −M
A
EX > M
O
B = MB −M
B
EX since MA > MB and M
A
EX < M
B
EX
Average Profit in open economy is computed as follow:
p¯iOA= p¯iA + P
A
x p¯ix - P
B
x p¯ix = p¯iA + p¯ix (P
A
x − P
B
x )
p¯iOB= p¯iB + P
B
x p¯ix - P
A
x p¯ix = p¯iB + p¯ix (P
B
x − P
A
x )
Given that the probability of export is higher in Country”A” and average export profit is equalized
across countries, these 2 equations above show that while Free Trade increases average profitabil-
ity in the more efficient country(A),it makes firms in the other country(B),on average,less profitable.
4.7 GDP and Aggregate Profits in Open Economy
To assess the impact of Trade on the Output and the Aggregate Profit in each trading country, we
simply compare the value of these variables in Open economy to those obtained in Closed economy.
The equations below confirm that Free Trade makes the more efficient country(A) produce more
and enjoy higher Aggregate Profits and that these effects are completely opposite for the other
Country(B):
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*GDPOA=GDPA + M
A
x q˜
A
x - M
A
EX q˜A
=GDPA + P
A
X MA [RB(
p(ϕ˜Ax )
PB
)−σ] - PBx MB θB [RA(
p(ϕ˜A)
PA
)−σ]
⇒ ∆ GDPA > 0
Under the following ”Stability Condition”: dq˜A
dLA
= 0
(See Appendix for more details), we can write that:∆GDPA= f
+(MA)
*GDPOB= GDPB + M
B
X q˜
B
x - M
B
EX q˜B
=GDPB +P
B
X MB [RA(
p(ϕ˜Bx )
PA
)−σ] - PAx MA θA [RB(
p(ϕ˜B)
PB
)−σ]
⇒ ∆ GDPB < 0
Note that ∆ GDPB =f
−(MA) if this ”Stability Condition” is verified:
dq˜Bx
dLA
= 0
*ΠOA= M
O
A p¯i
O
A = (MA −M
A
EX) [p¯iA + p¯ix(P
A
x − P
B
x )]
=(MAp¯iA) + MAp¯ix(P
A
x − P
B
x ) - M
A
EX p¯iA - M
A
EX p¯ix(P
A
x − P
B
x )
⇒ ∆ΠA = (MA −M
A
EX) p¯ix(P
A
x − P
B
x ) - M
A
EX p¯iA
=MOA p¯ix(P
A
x − P
B
x ) - M
A
EX p¯iA > 0
∆ΠA = f
+(MA) under the following ”Stability Condition”:
dr˜Bx
dLA
= 0
*ΠOB= M
O
B p¯i
O
B= (MB −M
B
EX)[p¯iB + p¯ix(P
B
x − P
A
x )]
=(MBp¯iB) + MBp¯ix(P
B
x − P
A
x )- M
B
EX p¯i
O
B
⇒ ∆ΠB = −MBp¯ix(P
A
x − P
B
x ) - M
B
EX p¯i
O
B < 0
Note that ∆ΠB= f
−(MA) since ∆ΠB = f
−(MBEX) and M
B
EX=θAP
A
x MA
These equations reveal that the variations of the Output and Aggregate Profits in Country”A” are
an increasing function of its size(LA). However, Country B’s Output and Aggregate profits would
react more negatively to full liberalization of Trade if the size of their trading partner (LA) was
larger. For more details, see Appendix 1.2
4.8 Tax rate Adjustment
Given that Public Expenditures are identical across countries and equal to 1 and that each Govern-
ment has to balance its budget, an increase/decrease in Aggregate Profits leads to a decrease/increase,
with the same magnitude, of the tax rate.
As a result, while Country A, which enjoys higher Aggregate Profits in Open economy, alleviates
the fiscal burden on its firms, Country B taxes more its economy after full openness to Trade to
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compensate the decline in Aggregate Profits, as shown below:
Recall that the Gov’s budget constraint in each country is written:
Country”A”: tAΠA= 1 and Country”B”: tBΠB= 1
Taking Logs: Ln(tA)= - ln(ΠA) < 0 and Ln(tB)= - ln(ΠB) > 0
Hence, the equilibrium Tax rates in Open Economy are given by:
t∗
′
A= t
∗
A + Ln(tA) ⇒ t
∗
′
A < t
∗
A
t∗
′
B= t
∗
B + Ln(tB) ⇒ t
∗
′
B > t
∗
B
4.9 Analysis of the impact of Free Trade
Starting from a ”Closed Economy Equilibrium” where both countries have the same size(λ=LA
LB
=1
and GDPA = GDPB), the same level of Aggregate Profits(
ΠA
ΠB
= 1) and the same tax rate(
t∗
A
t∗
B
= 1),
we have shown that Free Trade makes the more efficient country(A) produce more(GDPOA > GDP
O
B )
and enjoy a relatively higher Aggregate Profit(
ΠO
A
ΠO
B
> 1) and a relatively lower Tax rate(
t∗
′
A
t∗
′
B
< 1).
Nevertheless, the variety gain is higher for Country B. In fact, its consumers enjoy a larger Mass of
additional varieties coming from Country A since this country has a higher Mass of exporters.
4.10 The Home Market effect still matters!
We have already proved that when both countries have the same size(λ=1), only Country A gains
from Trade in terms of production, Profitability and lower taxation. We have also shed light on
the fact that its gains,which are synonym of Losses for its trading partner(Country B), are an in-
creasing function of its size(LA).This implies that the variations of the relative GDP of Country
A, the relative Aggregate Profits of this country and the relative tax rate of Country B are all an
increasing function of the relative size of country A(λ). In other words, the larger the relative size
of Country A, the higher its gains and the bigger the losses for country B.
Hence, the Market size amplifies the initial impact of Trade on both countries!
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5 FDI
5.1 FDI,the Trade-off
We have previously shown that the higher the relative Market size of Country”A”(λ), the higher
the relative fiscal pressure in Country”B”( tB
tA
).
Firms located in the less efficient Country(B) are facing the following Trade-off:
-Either continue to produce locally,thus avoid paying the fixed FDI cost (Fi) but accept to be
relatively more taxed on their profits.
-Or pay (Fi), relocate their production to Country A and enjoy lower fiscal pressure.
5.2 FDI function
FDIAB= ln(
tB
tA
) - Fi
FDI from Country B to Country A is an increasing function of the relative size of this latter(λ). In
fact, the higher λ,the higher the relative Aggregate Profit in Country A and the higher the relative
tax rate in Country B. Thus, the stronger is the incentive for firms located in Country B to relocate
their production to the other Country to benefit from a more favorable tax regime.
FDIAB= ln(
tB
tA
) - Fi >0 ∀ λ > λ
∗
λ∗ represents the relative Market size cutoff beyond which the gain from lower taxation in Country
A exceeds the fixed FDI cost Fi. Therefore, when λ is high enough (λ > λ
∗), the fiscal burden
becomes so heavy in Country B that all the firms escape it through relocating their entire production
to Country A where the huge gains from Tax alleviation exceed by far the fixed FDI cost. This is
clearly illustrated in the figure below:
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5.3 GDP reaction to Relative Market Size
When the relative market size of Country A is not too high (λ < λ∗), the tax rate is relatively lower
in Country A but the gain from fiscal alleviation is not that large to compensate the fixed FDI cost.
Hence, there is no FDI and countries freely trade only. Their respective Outputs in Open economy
can be written as follow:
∀λ ∈ [1, λ∗[, we have:∀λ ∈ [1, λ∗[, we have:
GDPOA= GDPA + ∆GDPA(
+λ)
GDPOB= GDPB + ∆GDPB(
−λ)
However,when λ is high enough (λ > λ∗), taxation becomes so favorable in Country A that all the
firms of Country B decide to relocate their production to Country A. In other words, the more
efficient Country(A) fully absorbs its trading partner through FDI as shown below:
∀λ ∈ [λ∗,+∞[, and since FDIAB=GDPB we get :
*GDPOA= GDPA + FDI
A
B =GDPA + GDPB
*GDPOB= GDPB - FDI
A
B = 0
15
6 Conclusion
This simple model reveals that Free Trade between 2 countries having the same size(L) but different
productivity distribution makes the more efficient efficient country gain(produce more, enjoy higher
Aggregate Profit and alleviate fiscal pressure on its economy) and the other country lose(produce
less and tax more its economy to compensate the decline of Aggregate Profits).
Moreover, using the ”Home Market effect”,we noticed that The higher the relative size of the more
efficient country, the higher its gains from Trade and the larger the losses of the other country.
Furthermore, we shed light on the fact that the more efficient country can fully absorb its trading
partner through FDI when its relative size is beyond the cutoff λ∗.
To sum up, the main contribution of this paper is to prove that the more Asymmetric the countries
are, the more heterogeneous the impact of Trade is !
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1.1: Proof by Contradiction:
Let’s assume that ϕ∗Ax =ϕ
∗B
x =ϕ
∗
x and compare r
A
x (ϕ
∗
x) to r
B
x (ϕ
∗
x):
rAx (ϕ
∗
x)
rBx (ϕ
∗
x)
= (PB
PA
)σ−1 > 1 ⇒ rAx (ϕ
∗
x) > r
B
x (ϕ
∗
x)=σfx
⇒ piAx (ϕ
∗
x) > pi
B
x (ϕ
∗
x) = 0
Hence, ϕ∗Ax has to be < ϕ
∗B
x such that (
p(ϕ∗Ax )
PB
)=(p(ϕ
∗B
x )
PA
)
This ensures that rAx (ϕ
∗A
x )=r
B
x (ϕ
∗B
x ) = σfx. Thus, pi
A
x (ϕ
∗
x) = pi
B
x (ϕ
∗
x) = 0
7.2 Appendix 1.2: Stability Conditions
q˜A , q˜Bx and r˜
B
x are increasing functions of the Aggregate Revenues (RA) and the Aggregate Price
level (PA) in country”A”.
An increase in the Market size of Country”A” (LA) has 2 opposite effects on these 2 determinants:
-it increases the Aggregate Revenues (RA), which shifts upward q˜
A , q˜Bx and r˜
B
x
-it decreases the Aggregate Price level (PA) because it implies a larger Mass of firms [M = f
+(L)
and P = f−(M)].
Hence, the relative price (p(ϕ)
PA
)−σ increases,which weakens the price-competitiveness and shifts down-
ward q˜A , q˜Bx and r˜
B
x
We assume for simplicity that these 2 effects cancel out by writing : dq˜A
dLA
= dq˜
B
x
dLA
= dr˜
B
x
dLA
= 0
This assumption allows us to isolate the effect of relative market size variation on the magnitudes
of gains/losses in Country A/Country B.
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